WFF are the physical means that tactical commanders use to execute operations and accomplish missions assigned by a superior commander. Great points, as always Bill. MS 301: Training Management and the Warfighting Functions Revision Date: 31 March 2022 Lesson 20,23,26,29,32: Branch Orientation Briefings Student Handout 1 Information Briefing Sheet Cadets will prepare and present an information briefing concerning an assigned branch. The Human Factor: The Enduring Relevance of Protecting Civilians in Future Wars. The conduct of Trusting and empowering subordinates to act, within the commanders intent, is a force multiplier. This fact is the real ball-breaker. For all the efforts at "understanding the culture" of the environments we are working it failed and I mean totally failed because we did not "understand the culture of the enemy". The Joint Staff Directorates and Joint . "A warfighting function is a group of tasks and systems united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives" (Department of the Army, 2019a, p. 5-2).. [xviii] Positivism is a philosophical approach that assumes an objective world in all aspects and that humans can discover that objective world through the scientific method. One organizations human domain is not how the ACoS uses it. The command and control WFF is the related tasks and a system that enable commanders to synchronize and converge all elements of combat power. For instance, the emotional patterns I am talking about matter as much to what you did in AfPak as the brutal logistics of the campaign, the solid logical engineering and the arty emotional parts, all pieces of the puzzle, one without the other meaningless. But, if that statement mirrors the missions SOF receives, then there needs to be a deeper and more meaningful meaning-of-life-come-to-Jesus type conversation that needs to be had in Tampa about what UW/SW is as a tool and how policy shapes its implementation. They could learn nothing at all about what the people in a platoon outpost are likely to do by looking at small town America. My empiricism is not the empiricism that you sometimes criticize, is it? Those of us from the old UW days call it simply the guerrilla Darwinian principle of survival in order to fight another day or what today is called simply "staying power". b. The seven warfighting functions are command and control, fires, force protection, information, intelligence, logistics, and maneuver. Human populations, however, are characterized by different viewpoints and limiting oneself to only one view of the world can be disastrous if trying to make sense of things and initiate a desired effect. The Pushtoon Secessionists fighting the Pak Army across the border in Pakistan are a good fit but a similar approach to Counter UW is IMO a dead loss at best and dangerously ruinous at worst. Being on defense (containment) re: great powers of differing values, attitudes and beliefs to. c. And know the kind of war that one is embarked upon. [xvi] See Donald A. Schon, The Reflective Practitioner: How professionals think in action. The commander and staff leverage the intelligence enterprise, coach and train the intelligence core competencies, implement the operations and intelligence processes, and direct the intelligence effort through the intelligence capabilities. Also see Paparone, Chris, COL (ret. Other reasons include the drawdown in manpower and money as well as the way the military institution uses concepts to try to align disparate and bureaucratic organizations towards a common goal.[xv]. [xv] COL John Boyd famously said (and I paraphrase): The military has a strategy. A warfighting function is a group of tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives. "Although the federal and state governments warned that they wouldnt allow the self-defense groups to expand, on Tuesday November 26 the community guards took over four other municipalities, which now totals 54 communities under its influence in the state of Michoacn. [xxxii] And what were really talking about is internalized social change. For purposes of the definition, the term enemy includes the entire range of threats and the term terrain includes weather. Combat Power= mission command+fires+intelligence+protection+sustainment+movement & maneuver+leadership. Complete discussions by all ranks and ages---and we ran MDMP even in the 60s but it was creative and free thinking for all until the team was comfortable with the solution. All systems used to coordinate the delivery of these effects are included in the Fires WFF, and are therefore inherently linked to the Targeting and ISTAR IPA discussed later. [xxviii] To be fair, the writers of this first iteration of the handbook were given a very short timeframe with which to complete the project. Sparapet---this is not a notional example----it is the core problem with such discussions as this one especially when it goes towards UW/SW. What was it we missed in our estimates of the enemy meaning long term they were finished (was not the surge success an indicator that they were finished) ---even though we got the indigenous side IE Iraqi security forces human domain right or at least we thought right. Thus if we, as you say, did not shy away from explaining exactly what this generations' mission was (summed up as offense rather than defense), then might we see the greater innovation, artestry, etc., that we are looking for? What happens when the local populations finally after being brutually held down and are afraid to even come out of their houses DOES come out of their houses fully armed and willing to defend their villages/towns/cities? Entire tribes vanished as smallpox, scarlet fever, and influenza decimated the native population of the Americas. This is the future that the ACoS means when he mentions human domain---what he does not mention ---it can only be handled via UW/SW. Also let me suggest that our enemies may have a better understanding of our political objective -- and, thus, the war that we and they are embarked upon -- than do many of our leaders and soldiers. The Staff have maps the Beards would give their right arms for, sat/drone photos they would not believe and a 24/7 live video feed I doubt they could even imagine. One could argue that General Lee based his operations in the North during the Civil War as a way to influence the Northern population to put pressure on President Lincoln and the US government to end the war; did he not? Strategically, that failure to understand the human factor is the root of the abject failure that the Army, Marines, and SOCOM are determined not to repeat.. I suggest we too may benefit by inserting a MIE multiplier into our MDMP. Our response, by invading two countries and then seeking to replace their forms of government with a model based on our own, could actually be seen as counterproductive because it played into the hands of the terrorists strategy to expose the West as an imperial crusader? Our group believing that we might have made some progess in this, our generational project. Listed below are the main points from those ideas. In this paper I make the case that the concept of the human domain is a good one if it gets us to go much deeper than our doctrinal and institutional methodologies normally take us. I am again going to shy away from your basic argument even though I agree with you. The human domain, a conceptualization of the influence that populations have on military operations, is one way of viewing reality. This goes back to your comments concerned SW vs what I call the glorious kick down the door mentality. Intelligence 5. mation as a joint function is but the first step toward enhancing joint warfighting and developing a future joint force able to dominate in the conflicts of tomorrow. So as we go into a country in Africa or in the Middle East or the Pacific region, were learning about them. I think as well that the difference between the 60s and now is the length of rotations---we had a year to gain experience---AND the replacement process was individual replacements not team replacements--this allowed a sizeable amount of institutional knowledge to remain inside the team all the time---now whole teams come and go thus the institutional knowledge disappears if not passed on extremely well during RIP/TOA. Now I wish I would have written something more helpful. The first being the political aspect of military operations and the second being tied to the firstthat democracy is a bottoms up political ideologywhere political power is rested with the people. The purpose of the Protection WFF is to preserve combat power, the ability of the force to operate in the threat environment. Because the underlying social rules and mechanisms are created by humans, they are constantly evolving over time and geography. Most of the current inhabitants have only known ruin and violence and thus are understandably incapable of informing themselves as to what they want, let alone articulate such an abstract sentiment to a foreign infidel HT team. At the operational level we are sorely handicapped. In your case in Iraq any place where there were loads of screens. This Warfighting Function is the process of deploying troops to operational areas as well as maneuvering troops, equipment and arms to gain advantage over the enemy. When 9-11 happened and you moved quickly into Afghanistan, this mood, this background, this context, these connections, this forgotten yet still present military institutional emotional history, alive even if buried deep within, surfaced only at the time of the OBL raid. The CIMIC aspect of the IA WFF is composed of all systems, capabilities and elements tasked to support or otherwise engage with the non-military communities, including dedicated CIMIC units. [xx] The U.S. military and SOF used to do this naturally prior to the Cold War by drastically drawing down the Army and doing away with SOF altogether after a war. This is the reality that stares us in the face when we start talking about the "human domain.". Internalized change, however, is that change which comes from within- whether perceived or not. The system is duplicatable and is used from the smallest of units up to large battalions and brigades. Small Wars Journal is published by Small Wars Foundation - a 501(c)(3) non-profit corporation. [xxxiv] White, Curtis, 7. Actually making these things happen in the face of the current drawdown, our relatively recent infatuation with technology and the inexplicable application of physical domain concepts to the human domain, however, will be a herculean task. For all the efforts at "understanding the culture" of the environments we are working it failed and I mean totally failed because we did not "understand the culture of the enemy". This category only includes cookies that ensures basic functionalities and security features of the website. Coupled with a chain of command that exploits their multi-generational familial ties, tribal ties and 30 years of shared camaraderie the HN practice a tactical and operational methodology they call Jihad and we call Mission Command. This conundrum was fixed by the Army at Fort Leavenworth by forcing the concepts of design, an anti-methodological approach, into a methodology! Despite vicious religious practices, the Aztec demonstrated ingenuity by inventing an innovative farming technique to grow crops among the 30 canals of Tenochtitlan. A particular IED group had been literally giving us fits meaning statistically seen a gun truck would be hit once in every three trips out the wire---this particular group had gotten extremely good with RC IEDs. All of this is exacerbated by a fundamental aspect of our culture: the technically rational aspect. In order for SOF to best contribute to operations within the human domain I assert that we have to do two things: 1) ensure our doctrine and concepts support a more nuanced and dynamic approach to operations at the conceptual level and, 2) mimic at the operational and strategic levels the same kinds of things that make us special at the tactical level. The success of unified action depends on the application of capabilities that influence the perceptions, understanding, and actions of relevant populations To operate more effectively in the land domain while fully accounting for the human aspects of conflict and war, the Army requires a warfighting function to capture the tasks and systems that provide lethal and nonlethal capabilities to assess, shape, deter, and influence the decisions and behavior of a people, its security forces, and its government.. We will do all of this while we continue down a path that relegates us to being little better than our conventional brethren in terms of operational and strategic prowess. There are three types of social change or influence according to some: compliance, identification, and internalization (Kelman HC, Compliance, Identification, and Internalization: Three processes of attitude change, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1958, 51-60.). Interestingly, I also remember a study was published that basically argued all this newfound freedom of access was being counter-productive because psychologically the soldier never really left home due to this ability to instantly communicate with those back at home on almost a daily basis. The open-ended nature of part two however, puts you in a big 'ol pickle. D. the Aztecs had no calendar to determine the best time to grow flowers. If one took the time to "understand the Sunni, Shia and AQI in Iraq one "saw" them at work---their surveillance, their targeting process, their swarm tactics and especially their thinking on the use of IEDs---and if one "understood" that then one could move onto their strategy which drove their battlefield tactics. Table. Today is the hour for citizen self-management. When I was able to get a BCT to change their behavior every single day ---then we started getting a changed battlefield as we were forcing the insurgent to delay or stop planned attacks until they figured out why we suddenly changed---plain old fashioned UW that has not changed much in the last 100 years. Example ---who would have assumed two years ago that the fighting in Syria would in fact become the ME's center of a religious civil war where the issue of the Shia revival is coming to a point--- drawing militant Shia and Sunni's in from as far away as AFG (yes even AFG Shia are drifting into Syria now). [xxvi] The tactical level (young NCOs and officers) seems in my experience to have largely remained mission-focused and results oriented. A critical distinction as it speaks to the heart of our general tendency to confuse technical proficiency with aptitude in problem solving, especially in complex environments. RantCorp--just how many hours of any given day did either the AQI, the Sunni IAI or the Shia Iraqi Hezbollah spend just simply watching every move a BCT or Marine Regt made in Iraq---kind of like a pattern of life targeting process just in reverse and just how much times does the HiG or the Taliban spend watching our every move in AFG-----hours, days, weeks? Administrative movement (generally movement via strategic transport) is included in the Sustainment WFF. A warfighting culture is exactly that, it's a culture. [xxix] Then-Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Commanding General, General Martin E. Dempsey, according to one anonymous School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) instructor, told the SAMS authors of the draft design publication that it was too long, had too many big words, and didnt have any of our current doctrinal concepts like Center of Gravity in it. Whether this is true or not, shortly thereafter Dr. Jack Kem wrote a short design booklet (Design: Tools of the Trade) that linked design to doctrine and as soon as LTG William B. Caldwell IV left Fort Leavenworth for Afghanistan and took Dr. Kem with him, the original draft authors quickly published The Art of Design, Student Text 2.0, which attempted to undo the changes that TRADOC reportedly had ordered. Preferably we should take our cues from critical realism and multi-paradigmatic framing and reject the notion that the social realm should be approached using mainly the scientific method and linear logical tools and processes. This is juxtaposed with an operation like Desert Storm in which the objectives were clear and limited in both scope and time, even if they were limited somewhat artificially and ignoring the obvious connection to Operation Iraqi Freedom. SF majors who are not selected to be S-3 operations officers for a Group (brigade-level organization) are rarely considered competitive for tactical command, however SF Groups do not fight as Groups, normally SF fights as teams. And no one sees the need for UW as the core ability of SF? Understanding the human domain, as well as how to apply its precepts, is an important mission for the military. Using the vocabulary list for the lesson, supply the correct word to complete the sentence. In plain English, the 7 th WfF is all of the tasks and systems that military units would need to do or have to influence people, taking into account the "socio-economic, cognitive, and physical aspects of human activity". It is what makes bringing a cookie-cutter approach to COIN and UW to be such a terrible idea, and yet our bureaucracy forces us into these approaches at the operational and higher levels. To boot, recent history seems to have muddied the waters on the subject. The difference is that equipment is easy to count, education is not. Just how many deploying BCT personnel fully understood the fighting tactics being used by the various Sunni, Shia, and AQI personnel ---did the Army via PME every have classes on this topic? This is distinct from a highly skilled practitioner of a set of skills (I.e. Virtually everyone knows what our end-game objective is. What came after was different. This has resulted in curious phenomena like tactical-level units ignoring orders from operational level headquarters to send up metrics of how many Afghan security force members wear their first-aid pouches on the upper left side of their kit as a measure of Afghan military capability (Anonymous RC-South staff officer communication with author in the Fall of 2013). It accomplishes this through adopting measures and conducting actions to reduce the risk posed by adversary, environmental and other threats and hazards. Direct fire is inherent in maneuver, as is close combat. It also includes the non-physical aspects of the force such as information and reputation. In some aspects the Civilian Defense groups are forcing the military and federal police to start offenses against some of the TCOs but it should be noted that the military and federal police have been are to a degree also corrupted by the TCOs. Sustainment determines the depth and duration of Army operations. With that being said, there has been a push to allow our warfighters greater freedoms with these tools because its being argued that we are losing the message and by allowing greater freedom with these tools we are allowing our warfighters to get the positive message out. It is unlikely they have ever viewed the target with their M1Es and probably never will. The Staff may have been there a week but no more than a year. Both tactical and operational maneuver require logistic support. When someone asked him a difficult question, Walt _____ because he did not know the answer. The joint functions, then, were never intended to be another level of organiza-tion. The Spaniards were forced to retreat from the city, but they soon regrouped and besieged the Aztec capital. Our technical surveillance enables smart weapons which largely depend on digitized enabled surveillance. The fires warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that provide collective and coordinated use of Army indirect fires, AMD, and joint fires through the targeting process. Ignoring for a moment that viewing reality through the lens of domains is only one way- and quite possibly a very bad way- of attempting to make sense of the world, the concept of the human domain has resulted in some confusion for many within the Army and Special Operations. That is, they encompass so much that they are rendered almost useless. Manage Consent Preferences. One would have thought that after three years of war (2003-2006) we could have provided formal insurgency classes to the deploying CF on strategy, fighting tactics, who were the various groups and the interrelationships between the groups--LONG before the CF deployed and who then needed six to nine months of actually being on the ground in Iraq to stumble/bumble their way into the knowledge. D. The World Trade Organization (WTO). Thus they are able to remain mission-focused and results-oriented. and are likewise both required to understand it. [xxi] I would assume Jean Baudrillard, from his Simulacra and Simulation (1981), would have a field day with how we have conducted Afghanistan. That strategy is to get more money. Others, such as Carl Builder, mentioned in footnote 12, as well as this authors own experiences highlight the bureaucratic pressures that lead to the chase for more money within government bureaucracies. The centrally-managed personnel system, the system of intellectual communication (doctrine-based), the acquisition and resources system (JCIDS), and the hierarchical nature of the military have combined to produce a largely tail wagging the dog sort of institution. This positivist[xviii] philosophy would be bad if we simply believed it consciously. Instead it would encourage critical and creative thinking, demand a multi-framed approach at the most fundamental of levels, and require learning-in-action or reflective practice. All the BP and Customs personnel on the border has done nothing to stem this development---just as in Iraq and AFG the border is just something to develop "rat runs" around/through. Upon promulgation of Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-0 with Change 2, this modified description is approved for inclusion in the next edition of reference (i). Original content is published under aCreative Commons Licenseper ourTerms of Use. Sydney J. Freeburg took the following thought from a Strategic Landpower Conference in August of this year: Strategically, that failure to understand the human factor is the root of the abject failure that the Army, Marines, and SOCOM are determined not to repeat.[xiii] This follows on the heels of the Armys Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency Manual and subsequent debates between the COINdinistas, such as John Nagl who have pushed for a human-centricity in contemporary war efforts, and those who would advocate that the narrative being sold on Iraq is flat-out wrong. Maneuver is the means by which commanders mass the effects of combat power to achieve surprise, shock, and momentum. This is good to know information for any commander or staff officer. You also have the option to opt-out of these cookies. Flip it over and consider how much time ALQ/Taliban spend studying small town USA in an effort to understand how to best engage the US Army and USMC? Warfighting Functions: The seven mutually supporting military activities integrated in the conduct of all military operations. If you think that AQI killed a large number of locals in Iraq try even understanding the current numbers in Mexico---if one thought Iraq did not have a functioning governance Mexico is even worse and they claim they are democratic. [x] U.S. Army, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-0, The U.S. Army Capstone Concept, 19 DEC 2012, 15-16. This example was taken straight out of the website "borderland beat" which treats totally the Mexican and Central American transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs)--AND if you think beheadings were a thing of AQI in Iraq---one will see the actual bodies in the web site and if one thought Hezbollah had a corner on social activities in Lebanon think twice when one looks at Mexico---if one thinks that the TCOs do not tangate the US check recent reports out of Tulsa OK. - See more at: http://www.aspeninstitute.org/node/12081#sthash.YjMssWdV.dpuf. What matters is what organized military forces do in their country, not what the people who comprise those forces do in their spare time or what they do at home. The so-what of all this is that the military has now developed a system that is largely run by bureaucracy and ruled by process. That the autodefensas exist and have the capacity to organize armed resistance to TCO's does not mean that they should be helped (timely

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